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SUMMARY
There has been considerable interest in the creation of a global
competition regime in the WTO since its conception. It is an issue that
has always emerged in the forum's agenda, and yet, more than ten
years later, the international trading system has been unable to agree
on a global competition framework. Notwithstanding the current
agreement to hold any framework negotiations in abeyance to enable
the Doha Round negotiations to proceed, two interesting conclusions
can be drawn. First of all, that the agreement pertains only to negotia-
tion related discussions and not discussions per-se on the issue of com-
petition. This would mean that the work of the working group on
competition will continue. Secondly, it demonstrates the importance
of competition to both developing and developed members in the WTO,
in that it has become a deciding factor on the furtherance of trade lib-
eralization in the WTO. There are suggestions that the reasons for the
lack of unanimous support in the WTO for its inclusion could be due to
one of two reasons: practical co-operation or ideological differences.
This article will establish that it is the disparity in development be-
tween member economies in the WTO that is the root of this failure.
The paper will examine the various competition related issues that
manifest as a result of this disparity in the context of suggestions by
academics, regarding cooperation, ideological differences and harmoni-
zation of competition laws. This article will also examine work under-
taken at various international fora and will demonstrate that the
disparity in development is a common issue that cuts across the vari-
ous suggestions offered in this regard, submitting that for reasons re-
lating to membership and workability, the WTO has been the most
successful in narrowing this gap. This article will discuss the possibil-
ity of a WTO competition framework based on elements identified by
members in the Doha Ministerial Declaration and analyze submis-
sions of members to the WTO Working Group. Notwithstanding the
agreement on elements, the development disparity makes consensus
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on the scope of such elements difficult. This article will conclude that
it is possible that most developing and some developed countries may
not at the moment be prepared to take on a commitment on global
competition, which would entail sacrificing autonomy over strategic
trade policy and a degree of sovereignty respectively.
THE IMPORTANCE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY
Although some authors approach the need for a global competi-
tion regime from a consumer versus market access perspective,' it is
submitted that the issue is one that will need to balance both these
issues with the additional issues of efficiency and enhancing global
welfare and development.2 The importance of competition policy is
said to be premised on the concept of perfect competition.' Although
this concept will not be examined here,4 it suffices to say that markets
are imperfect, as businesses have a tendency to combine or make
agreements that are profitable for them at the expense of overall wel-
fare.5 Further, the role of public choice and strategic trade policy
should not be discounted from the equation,6 although some authors
ignore the impact of public choice when discussing the interaction be-
tween trade policy and competition policy.7
The main issue underlying the lack of achievement of a global
consensus on competition is that it is seen as a solution to concerns
arising from developments in the international trading system for both
developed and developing countries. However, such solutions are ap-
proached from totally opposite directions. The process of globalization
and trade liberalization has raised different concerns for these coun-
tries. For developing countries domestically, competition transcends
purely economic considerations, effecting social policies and political
choice.' The need to maintain such domestic policies to enable prepa-
ration of domestic industries to compete globally is seen as a very im-
portant policy tool.9 For developed countries, competition is seen as a
' See Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 489 (2000).
2 Edward Iacobucci, The Interdependence of Trade and Competition Policies, 21(2)
WORLD COMPETITION 5, 6 (1997) (Belg.).
3 See SHANKARAN NAMBIAR, A MULTILATERAL COMPETITION FRAMEWORK IN THE
WTO: A DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE, MALAY. INST. OF ECON. RES. 1 (2002).
4 See generally D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW 10 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing
the principle of perfect competition).
5 See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 4 (2001) (discussing perfect competition).
6 See lacobucci, supra note 2.
7 See NAMBIAR, supra note 3, at 3; lacobucci, supra note 2, at 12.
8 Iacobucci, supra note 2, at 6.
9 See NAMBIAR, supra note 3, at 4-5.
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way of circumventing barriers erected by developing countries through
strategic trade policies to enable their industries to reap the benefits of
liberalized trade.
Recent trends in market systems of developing and socialist
countries have made the issue of competition policy more prominent.1 0
The impact of private anti-competitive behavior supported by lax or
non-existent competition policies in these countries create barriers
that operate similarly to traditional trade barriers such as tariffs and
quotas, previously dismantled through multilateral trade negotiations
(particularly the WTO agreements). The undesirability of such a situ-
ation has two effects. Firstly, strategic trade policy and public choice
reduces global welfare" and secondly, globalized business activities
have led to concerns over increased multi-jurisdictional antitrust vio-
lations. 2 These have led to the utilization of unilateral measures to
secure changes in behavior of businesses in another country,13 causing
uncertainty due to the differing views of competition authorities and
tensions resulting from unilateral measures between trading
partners.' 4
The ability of anti-competitive practices to derail the develop-
ment of international trade has long been appreciated. 5 The WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures seeks to check
governmental interference in relation to world prices, through creating
certainty and transparency in relation to governmental subsidies,' 6
and emphasizing the illegality of subsidies contingent on export per-
formance." Although some claim that WTO initiatives only restrain
governmental behavior,' s it is submitted that this is not entirely accu-
rate, as the WTO Antidumping Agreement' 9 has, as its objective, the
10 Id.
11 Iacobucci, supra note 2, at 6.
12 Tohiaki Takigawa, Harmonisation of Competition Law after Doha: Substantive
and Procedural Harmonisation, 36(3) J. WORLD TRADE 1111, 1111 (2002) (Neth.).
13 Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Multilateral Rules on Competition Pol-
icy: A Possible Way Forward, 31(5) J. WORLD TRADE 95, 96 (1997) (Neth.); see also
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk and Nico W. Mensink, Measuring Globalization, 31(3) J.
WORLD TRADE 159, 159 (1997) (Neth.) (providing further elaboration).
14 See Iacobucci, supra note 2, at 13.
15 Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 96.
16 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. I, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter ASCM], available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocs-elegal-e/24-
scm.pdf.
17 ASCM art. 3.1(a).
18 Tarullo, supra note 1, at 479.
19 See generally Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of General Agreement
of Tariffs and Trade 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/
19-adp.pdf (displaying text of Antidumping Agreement in its entirety).
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rectification of private anti-competitive behavior.2 ° Resulting from
these Agreements, developing countries encountered problems in "lev-
eling the field of play" for their industries. 2 ' The challenge for the in-
ternational trading community, therefore, is to convey to developing
countries: firstly, the positive impact of competition on welfare and
why global welfare is important; secondly, a solution to concerns re-
garding strategic trade policy; and thirdly, that developing countries
will not be marginalized from any process for a global competition
regime.
COOPERATION
Practical Cooperation
There are two dimensions to cooperation. The first is bilateral
co-operation between competition authorities, as suggested by the
United States2 2 and supported by a number of authors.2 3 This ap-
proach belies one of the major circumspections with which developing
countries view global competition initiatives. Such an approach
marginalizes developing countries, as many of them do not have com-
petition laws.2 4 Further, it is submitted that such an approach is seri-
ously flawed, as it does not address competition at a global level. The
weakness in such agreements can be seen from the problems faced
during the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, where the diverging
approaches taken by United States and EU competition authorities
made it impossible to reach a commonly acceptable solution.
25
This flaw raises two separate concerns for developing coun-
tries, firstly the application of domestic laws beyond borders,26 and
secondly, the disadvantage faced by the weaker country in such bilat-
20 See Mervyn Martin, Globalisation, Corporate Governance, and Competitiveness,
J. MALAY. INST. OF ACCT., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 33; see also Gilbert R. Winham,
NAFTA Chapter 19 and the Development of International Administrative Law,
32(1) J. WORLD TRADE 65, 65 (1998) (Neth.).
21 "Leveling the field of play" as opposed to "level playing field," is a term advo-
cated by Dato' Jegadesan, former Deputy Director General of the Malaysian In-
dustrial Development Authority (MIDA).
22 Olivier Cadot et al., Trade and Competition Policy: Where Do We Stand?, 34(3)
J. WORLD TRADE 1, 12 (2000) (Neth.).
23 Tarullo, supra note 1, at 499.
24 Andrea Giardina & Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Settling Competition-Related
Disputes: The Arbitration Alternative in the WTO Framework, 31(6) J. WORLD
TRADE 5, 6 (1997) (Neth.).
25 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 1059; see also Phedon Nicolaides, For a World
Competition Authority, 30(4) J. WORLD TRADE 131, 137 (1996) (Neth.) (citing eight
examples of critical differences between U.S. antitrust law and EU competition
law).
26 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 1059.
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eral agreements. Some authors note that national authorities enforc-
ing their own national provisions extraterritorially cannot guarantee
the attainment of undistorted international trade.27 This is because of
three reasons. Firstly, it creates uncertainty within the international
trading system; secondly, it strikes at the heart of the sovereignty of a
nation, and thirdly, it is seen as unreasonable, or even as a type of
protectionism, as in the case of the United States.28 There are two
dimensions to the issue of extraterritoriality. Firstly, notwithstanding
some authors' assertion that United States and EU laws do not require
their respective competition authorities to take into account non-com-
petition considerations such as national interests, 29 it is submitted
that in practice, they do. To substantiate this submission is the U.S.
admission that its approval of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger
was based on its defense interests. 3' The compatibility of extraterrito-
riality in international law and the sovereignty of a nation are closely
connected. 3 1 Although the idea of the effects doctrine is receiving in-
creasing acceptance in the context of competition related matters due
to the transnational effects of anti-competitive practices,32 it is sub-
mitted that domestic policy objectives have no place in such an equa-
tion. Further, part of the criticisms of the EU's approach of the Gencor
case 33 was that it disregarded the fact that the South African govern-
ment considered and approved the merger, considering it to be good for
its economy. The decision is viewed by some as a blatant disregard for
South Africa's sovereignty.3 4
The second issue in relation to bilateral cooperation agree-
ments also stems from the Gencor case, where a comparison between
the decision of the EU in this case and the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger caused some authors to question if the EU decision would be
the same if South Africa was as powerful as the United States. 35 This
concern will cause developing countries to doubt the feasibility of en-
27 Nicolaides, supra note 25, at 137-38.
28 See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 1045 (discussing the treble damages pro-
vision of the Clayton Act and how U.K. statutes forbid the enforcement of treble
damages in U.K. courts).
29 Nicolaides, supra note 27, at 137.
30 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 1058.
31 See Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 338-39 (Malcolm D.
Evans, ed., 2003).
32 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Govern-
ments and for Private Business: The Case for Linking Future WTO Negotiations on
Investment, Competition, and Environmental Rules to Reforms of Anti-Dumping
Laws, 30(3) J. WORLD TRADE 5, 13 (1996) (Neth.).
33 Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753.
31 See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5, at 1065.
35 Id. at 1066.
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tering into bilateral negotiations with developed countries. This point
is, to an extent, substantiated by the fact that the current competition
related bilateral cooperation agreements are predominantly between
developed countries.
3 6
Technical Cooperation
The other dimension relating to cooperation is technical coop-
eration and competition advocacy. In an era where emphasis is placed
on discussions for a global competition regime, it is submitted that
many authors 37 discuss the possible means of achieving such a regime
without paying sufficient cognizance to the fact that a significant num-
ber of developing countries have yet to adopt a competition law.38
Where the issue encompasses a regime of a global nature, it is submit-
ted that such a decision has to be taken by all stakeholders, including
developing countries. However, these countries do not have sufficient
experience with competition issues to approach such a task.39 It is
here that the issue of technical cooperation becomes important. There
have been such endeavors on mainly three fronts. First of all, under
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD),4 ° the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD),4 1 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).4 2 It
must be stressed that cooperation of this type will only be successful if
there are positive efforts from both sides. Developing countries must
participate actively and meaningfully in such exchanges to fully appre-
36 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 594 (3d ed. 2005).
37 See Giardina & Zampetti, supra note 24, at 9.
38 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 36, at 591 (stating that almost 50 WTO
members have yet to enact a domestic competition law).
39 Petros C. Mavroidis & Sally J. Van Siclen, The Application of GATT/ WTO Dis-
pute Resolution System to Competition Issues, 31(5) WORLD TRADE 1, 19 (1997); see
also Martin, supra note 22, at 33 (inferring that the scope of such cooperation
should not be limited to governmental institutions; there will be a need to educate
the business sector, as in many developing countries, they have been operating
without a competition-based culture for a long time).
40 Through initiatives of its Intergovernmental Group of Expert Meeting on Com-
petition Law and Policy produced a model law on Competition.
41 Which has been involved in the promotion of not only competition, through joint
efforts with UNCTAD and World Bank, but also has been involved in outlining
guidelines for the conduct of competition authority cooperation across national
boundaries.
42 The First Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
1996 established a working group to study the interaction between trade and com-
petition to assist in capacity building for the possible development of a multilat-
eral framework in competition policy.
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ciate the importance of a competitive trading environment and its ben-
efits to welfare enhancement, rather than using technical cooperation
as a means for postponing or delaying binding commitments.
Ideological differences
The concerns pertaining to ideological differences create a
range of issues. Firstly the use of strategic trade policy in furtherance
of industrial, economic and socio-economic developmental objectives.
The role of the state here, especially in East Asia has been overwhelm-
ingly acknowledged.4 3 It is also a policy tool utilized by most develop-
ing countries through private entities for resilience building as a result
of the current trading environment. The regulation of private anti-
competitive behavior will be seen as undermining the development
process of these countries.
Connected to this issue is the concern of loss of sovereignty for
governments in developing countries to decide and initiate develop-
ment related initiatives. An important issue in the context of public
choice and strategic trade policy is sovereignty. Some approach sover-
eignty separate from public choice and strategic trade policy.4 4 It is
submitted that the issue of sovereignty is the underlying issue in rela-
tion to the use of strategic trade policy and public choice, and that the
three issues should not be considered separately. Governments must
be accountable to the electorate and to an extent are responsible for
the survival and success of their industries. Therefore they should be
free to conduct the business of achieving such objectives within their
borders. This issue is pertinent to both developed and developing coun-
tries; for instance, market-restructuring in the Malaysian banking sec-
tor in preparation for liberalization commitments,4 5 and the use of
competition policy to further the single market objective for the EU.46
The political and social environment in developing countries is
very different from developed countries. The impact of civil and politi-
cal instability is much greater in developing countries when govern-
43 Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER), Report on Study of Restric-
tive Business Practices and Their Effects on Malaysia's Competitive Dynamics 22
(2003).
44 See generally Iacobucci, supra note 2, at 5-28.
'5 Press Release, Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia), Domestic
Banking Sector Consolidation Programme, (Oct. 21, 1999), available at http:ll
www.mir.com.my/lb/econ-plan/contents/press-release/211099.htm.
46 Treaty of Rome, arts. 2 and 3 (g) Mar. 25, 1957, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; see also
VALENTINE KoRAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-12 (7th ed. 2000);
BARRY. RODGER & ANGUS. MACCULLOCH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE Eu-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED KINGDOM 16-22 (2d ed., 2001).
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ments are seen to have failed in these objectives.47 Another issue
relating to strategic trade policy and sovereignty is that the developing
country growth trajectory is different from that of developed countries,
and, therefore, their concerns over the sovereignty of their trade policy
are not impossible to understand. 4' Developing countries still feel the
need for governmental intervention for certain areas of economic activ-
ity, especially where liberalization could seriously disadvantage cer-
tain local industries.4 9 Also connected to this issue is public choice,
where although not as plausible a tool of the two, is an element that
should not be underemphasized due to its direct consequence on the
competitive process, implications on efficiency and prevalence in both
developed and developing countries.
HARMONIZATION
There have been many proposals attempting to offer a solution
to the issue of regulating competition at the international level.
Amongst these is the harmonization of competition laws. 50 Again, the
marginalisation of developing countries not having a domestic compe-
tition law is the primary concern for the viability of this proposal.
Many issues relating to this have been discussed above. However, it
must be added that there would be further difficulties in relation to
harmonization, stemming mainly from the diverging approaches major
competition systems take. 5 ' The interest in harmonization is said to be
fostered by two developments: globalization and regionalism.5 2 The is-
sue of globalization in this context has been discussed above, however,
it is submitted that again, in the context of regionalism, the participa-
tion of developing countries is marginalized as developing country re-
gional forums like the Association of South East Asian Nations, there
are no discussions relating to a regional competition policy.5 3 Assum-
47 An example of this is the civil unrest that eventually shifted from dissatisfac-
tion with the Indonesian government's handling of the Asian financial crisis in
1997, to racial attacks based on the contention of unequal distribution of wealth
between races in the country.
48 NAMBIAR, supra note 3, at 21.
49 Id. at 5.
50 Takigawa, supra note 12, at 1113-14; Matoo & Subramanian, supra note 15, at
96 (suggesting that this can be achieved, modeled after the harmonization exercise
undertaken for the WTO Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
1994).
51 Michael J. Trebilcock, Competition Policy and Trade Policy - Mediating the In-
terface, 30(4) J. WORLD TRADE 72 (1996).
52 Cadot, supra note 22, at 1.
53 See Asean Annual Report 2002-2003, Ch. 2 Economic Integration and Coopera-
tion, available at http://www.aseansec.org/viewpdf.asp?file=/arO3/pdf/chapter2.
pdf.
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ing that harmonization is the chosen route for a global competition
regime, such a regime would be heavily influenced not only by coun-
tries already with a competition regime, but, by the more influential of
them. If we consider United States and EU the most influential, then
it is fair to assume that these countries would influence such a harmo-
nization process. However, international competition rules will need to
focus on protecting competition and global welfare enhancement. Some
authors have stressed that to achieve this through harmonization may
be sub-optimal.5 4 This is because, taking the United States for exam-
ple, its regime does not seek to eliminate export cartels, which will
impact on welfare outside its borders.5 5 This has led developing coun-
tries to view such harmonization endeavors as a form of protectionist
"beggar thy neighbour" policies and an intrusion on political sover-
eignty.5 6 Another criticism of a U.S.-type influenced harmonization in-
itiative, is that market imperfection rectification should be carried out
at the exporters end. 57 Supporting this criticism are other authors' as-
sertions that the adverse impact of higher prices associated with ex-
port related imperfection would eventually impact on the exporting
country,5" leading to overall welfare loss as a result. It is submitted
that influential countries with such imperfection will need to address
them, as it might not only undermine the competition advocacy initia-
tives they have undertaken, but would also serve to escalate the cir-
cumspection of developing countries that a global competition regime
would only serve to enhance the welfare in developed countries. Indeed
the ambiguity of laws relating to vertical restraints in the EU, United
States and Japan 9 can easily be mistaken as being strategically am-
biguous for protectionist objectives. Further, as treaties seldom define
the meaning of international public good, one author stated that such
ambiguity has been strategically used by some countries through uni-
lateral claims that rules of other countries are unfairly endangering
international public good.6" Other authors claim that harmonization is
also unadvisable as it would be difficult to modify rules later, to accom-
modate developments in technology, organization of firms and the un-
derstanding of markets. 6 Some authors claim that harmonization
should focus on the interpretation and application and not the word-
ings contained in the various competition regimes. This, it is submit-
54 Cadot, supra note 22, at 14.
55 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 36, at 475.
56 Trebilcock, supra note 51, at 81.
57 Clarisse Morgan, Competition Policy and Anti-Dumping-Is it Time for a Reality
Check, 30(5) J. WORLD TRADE 62-65 (1996).
58 Trebilcock, supra note 51, at 77.
59 Takigawa, supra note 12, at 1114.
60 Trebilcock, supra note 51, at 84.
61 Mavroidis & Van Siclen, supra note 39, at 18.
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ted, would lend towards making harmonization more operational.
However, as discussed above, especially in the case of the Boeing/Mc-
Donnell Douglas merger, the inclusion of national priorities would
cause divergence in how any country views a particular issue.6 2
INTERNATIONAL FORUMS
The issues relating to the disparity in development discussed
above reflect the problems regarding consensus, based on views of aca-
demic writers. An examination of the various opinions and proposals
forwarded in relation to the forum for negotiating a global regime, and
the variance in perceptions by countries further reflect this disparity.
The International Competition Network (ICN)
The ICN was established based on a United States recommen-
dation and adopted by the major competition enforcement authori-
ties.6 3 Based on its philosophy, it is a good initiative for capacity
building and networking. The weakness of this forum to spearhead a
global competition framework is based on the prerequisite of a country
having dedicated competition legislation for membership.6 4 This se-
verely frustrates its capability for satisfying global capacity building
requirements, especially where it is most necessary, with countries not
having a competition law. Flowing from this criticism is the
probability that it will be dominated by developed country participa-
tion and influence, which would compromise the participation of devel-
oping countries, and would in turn lead to their marginalization.
Further, it is submitted, that the lack of trade related thinking in its
deliberations6 5 will make it a weak forum as the push for a global com-
petition regime is in pursuance of checking global anti-competitive
trade related practices.
UNCTAD
In 1980, the United Nations General Assembly adopted "The
UN set,"6 6 which has been reviewed four times since and was reaf-
62 See Cadot, supra note 22, at 14.
63 See Julian Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, A Multilateral Framework for Competi-
tion Policy, in THE SINGAPORE ISSUES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE ROAD
TO CANCUN AND BEYOND 24 (Simon J. Evenett, ed., 2003).
64 Id. at 41.
65 See id. at 24.
66 United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, Nov. 19-Dec. 8,
1979, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Con-
trol of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc A/C.2/35/6, annex. (Apr. 22, 1980).
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firmed in 2000.67 The problem with using UNCTAD as a forum for
global competition is that the UN set is a non-binding statement of
principles.6" UNCTAD is seen as a forum for discussion and coopera-
tion rather than an opportunity for nations to undertake binding nego-
tiations.6 9 Additionally, the Model Law on Competition specifically
states that it takes into account widely adopted competition legisla-
tion. This indicates that it does not specifically address the concerns of
developing countries.
OECD
OECD has been working on competition-related issues since
1967.70 It has been criticized for failing to ensure minimum standards
of global competition law enforcement. 7 1 Logically, the focus of
OECD's work will be on issues concerning developed countries. OECD
simply fails to address the gap between the interests of developed
countries and those of developing countries. It also fails to pacify the
circumspection that developing countries have regarding the inten-
tions of initiatives led by developed countries. It has also been criti-
cized for its degree of divergence between members within the OECD
on certain issues.7 2
Although there has been a strong push for the OECD to be a
host forum,7 3 potential flaws arising from the lack of enforceability,
such as the tendency of nations to place their own interests above com-
plying with non-binding commitments, make a global initiative
unrealistic. 4
WTO
Work on a multilateral framework on competition commenced
in 1997. The main advantage of the WTO is that, notwithstanding the
fact that competitive initiatives are led by developed countries, devel-
67 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Draft Commenta-
ries to Possible Elements for Articles of a Model Law or Laws, U.N. Doc TD/B/RBP/
8LJRev.5 (Feb. 20, 1998).
68 Morgan, supra note 57, at 89.
69 NAMBIAR, supra note 3, at 16.
70 Clarke & Evenett, supra note 63, at 26.
71 Id. at 27.
72 See, e.g., Giardina & Zampetti, supra note 24, at 9-10 (describing the collapse of
the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) after its members failed
to agree on the parameters of such an agreement).
73 Tarullo, supra note 1, at 494-99.
74 See EDWARD MONTGOMERY GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL Gov-
ERNMENTS: POSTWAR EFFORTS AT RULE MAKING 77 (1996).
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oping countries are not excluded from participating. 75 The forum is of
a global nature where developing countries have demonstrated their
interest in participation, although there are still differing interests
among members. Notwithstanding the fact that some developing
countries lack competition laws, the tone of members, particularly
those originally opposed to expanding the WTO competition initiative,
have gradually changed and resisting countries currently provide in-
put into possible elements, modalities, and parameters for a multilat-
eral framework. 76 This is largely a result of greater understanding of
the benefits of competition, which has been created through technical
cooperation at different levels, both within and outside of the WTO.
7 7
The Working Group focuses on anti-competitive practices that
disrupt trade practices and undermine the benefits of trade liberaliza-
tion.7 s Such a focus captures the attention of any WTO member. The
initiatives in the WTO have not discussed the issue of harmonization,
recognizing that one size does not fit all.7 9
At the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, members decided
to continue negotiations, based on consensus at the Cancun Ministe-
rial Conference in 2003.8° The text of the Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion provides insight into the development of a global competition
regime, by stating that technical assistance towards this end would
include the UNCTAD s1 and indicating the need to utilize neutral fo-
rums in the context of the developing/developed country divide. The
Declaration identified elements that should be incorporated into a
multilateral framework on competition.12 These elements, namely
transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural fairness, contain all
the tenants of the WTO, which members have already agreed upon.
8 3
Additionally, the Doha Ministerial Declaration includes provisions re-
garding cartels and modalities, as well as flexible special and differen-
tial (S&D) treatment for developing countries. An examination of
these elements in the context of member submissions indicates that,
notwithstanding the narrowing of the gap, there are still challenges
regarding the parameters of these elements.
75 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/
MIN(96)/DEC/ 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997).
76 India is an example.
77 World Trade Organization, Annual Report 2002-2003, at 53.
78 Clarke & Evenett, supra note 63, at 28.
79 Id.
80 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTI
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
81 Id. at 24.
82 Id. at 25.
83 Because the Doha Ministerial Declaration is a commonly accepted text, it is
presumed that there is a general consensus on these elements.
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Transparency
Member viewpoints on transparency fall into three major
groups.8 4 The first group is supportive of such provisions, recognizing
the importance of ensuring that the laws, regulations, and guidelines
of general application be made publicly available, while considering
the need for S&D through progressive introduction of these laws by
developing countries. s5 The second group is more cautious, stressing
the need to identify the scope of transparency.8 6 The third group advo-
cates flexibility, arguing that developing countries should not be ex-
pected to adhere to the same standards of transparency as those of
developed countries.8 7
While there is general agreement on the need for S&D, the de-
gree of this flexibility is uncertain. Does flexibility imply that trans-
parency standards cannot be uniform across all nations? Would
progressive introduction result in attaining similar standards between
all members? 8 Some have argued that Singapore and Hong Kong
were able to succeed based on their liberal trade policies, thereby guar-
anteeing that their markets remain open.8 9 Other have postured that
policies promoting competition measures prove that competition can
84 Clarke & Evenett, supra note 63, at 29.
85 See Submission of the European Community, European Community - Invest-
ment, Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade
Facilitation, WT/WGTCP/W/222 (Nov. 19 2002); see also Submission of Canada,
Canada-Investment, Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procure-
ment and Trade Facilitation, WT/WGTCP/W/226 (Mar. 2, 2003).
86 Submission of Hong Kong, Hong kong-Investment, Competition Policy, Trans-
parency in Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation, WT/WGTCP/W/224
(Mar. 5, 2003).
87 Submission of China, China-Investment, Competition Policy, Transparency in
Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation, WT/WGTCP/W/227 (Mar. 14,
2003); Submission of India, India-Investment, Competition Policy, Transparency
in Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation, WT/WGTCP/W/215 (Sept. 26,
2002); Submission of Thailand, Thailand-Investment, Competition Policy, Trans-
parency in Government Procurement and Trade Facilitation, WT/WGTCP/W/213
(Sept. 24, 2002).
88 These issues caused Hong Kong to require identification of scope to create
transparency. Generally, developing countries use government procurement pro-
cedures extensively in the pursuance of socio-economic developmental policies.
The unavailability of this avenue through a multilateral framework on competi-
tion requiring transparency may cause domestic problems. The difficulty in mov-
ing the work program for an agreement on transparency in the WTO is an
indication of the discomfort of developing countries.
89 See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 32, at 12 (stating that these economies do not
have competition laws).
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be ensured through industrial and trade policies.9 ° If the latter argu-
ment were accepted, the entire need for a global framework becomes
redundant. This approach does not consider public choice, nor does it
contemplate repercussions in an international context. Accordingly,
the issue of transparency in relation to domestic competition is essen-
tial in guaranteeing the success of the other core principles identified.
Non-discrimination
Non-discrimination in the context of a WTO agreement in-
volves two elements: the most favored nation and national treatment
principles.9 1 In defining these elements, some seek to limit them to de
jure discrimination in the context of national competition laws, rather
than a de facto discrimination.9 2 Others go further to state that de
facto type obligations would cause complications in relation to enforce-
ment policies, priorities, and prosecutorial discretion, including the ap-
plication of competition law to individual cases.9 3 Some members have
indicated a need for a system of exemptions built into the framework,
recognizing the necessity for contingencies regarding national inter-
ests.94 For example, Japan was interested in allowing bilateral agree-
ments to have precedence over multilateral agreements where there
were conflicts.9 5 Developing countries have predominantly voiced the
need for S&D,96 stressing that such a framework should include export
cartels for developed countries, but not for developing countries, as
their firms needed to band together to contrast the bargaining power
of multinational enterprises of developed countries. 97
90 See Pradeep S. Metha, Competition Policy in Developing Countries: An Asia Pa-
cific Perspective, BULL. ASIA-PAcIFIC PERSPECTIVES, at 80-81 (2002-03).
91 Clarke & Evenett, supra note 63, at 30.
92 Submission of Korea, Korea-Core Principles of Competition, WT/WGTCP/W/212
(Sept. 24, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=
1&_=1.
93 Submission of the European Community, European Community-Investment,
Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procurement and Trade Facilita-
tion, WT/WGTCP/W/222 (Nov. 19, 2002).
94 Submission of Australia, Australia-Core Principles, Including Transparency,
Non-discrimination and Procedural Fairness, WT/WGTCP/W/211 (Sept. 24, 2002),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=l&-=l.
95 Submission of Japan, Japan-Core Principles, WT/WGTCP/W/217 (Sept. 26,
2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=l&=l.
96 Submission of India, India-Non-discrimination in the Context of Competition
Policy: National Treatment, WT/WGTCP/W/216 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=l&=l; Submission of Thai-
land, Thailand-Core Principles, WT/WGTCP/W/213 (Sept. 26, 2002).
97 Bernard Hoekman, Competition Policy and the Global Trading System: A Devel-
oping Country Perspective, THE WORLD BANK, March 1997, available at http:ll
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There are several problems in reaching a consensus in this
area. First of all, there are connotations behind the regulation of ex-
port cartels, as it is a sensitive political area for the United States. It
is also an indication from developed countries that competition propo-
nents should "do as they say," rather than advocate competition poli-
cies to developing countries while maintaining anti-competitive
policies. The second issue is that the limitation to dejure discrimina-
tion, although having its merits, can be viewed as a method of main-
taining some kind of control over enforcement, as the United States
and European Union currently do. An example is the Aluminum Inter-
national Cartel case, where the EU chose not to prosecute a cartel al-
though it had jurisdiction to do so under EU competition law, probably
due to political affiliations.9" Such a situation also has the potential to
retard positive comity.
This situation is amplified by the Japanese concern that previ-
ous bilateral agreements should be given priority over multilateral ob-
ligations. This concern may be a stumbling block to the multilateral
process. Bilateral and regional agreements should complement,
rather than undermine, multilateral initiatives. 99 Such issues may
act to drive developed and developing countries apart, rather than nar-
rowing the gap between them.
Procedural Fairness
According to the WTO secretariat, there is convergence on four
issues of procedural fairness: the right to notice of investigation, the
right to a defense, the right of judicial review, and the need to protect
confidential information, including business secrets. 10 0 Developing
countries have been cautious in this arena, stressing on the need for
S&D regarding the gradual phase-in of such obligations. 10 1 China
went even further than other countries, stating that such procedural
systems should reflect a member's level of development. After the
transition period for implementation, members' standard of procedural
fairness should not be allowed to vary, as this would lead to inherent
ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/1735.html (stating that banning export cartels is
beneficial to developing countries).
98 See Frederic Jenny, Competition Law and Policy: Global Governance Issues, 26
WORLD COMPETITION L. & EcON. REV. 609, 611-14 (2003).
99 See ROBERT SCOLLAY & JOHN GILBERT, NEW REGIONAL TRADING AGREEMENTS IN
THE ASIA PACIFIC? 10 (2001).
100 Annual Report of the Working Group 2002, WT/WGTCP/6 (Dec. 9, 2002), avail-
able at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language= l&_= l.
101 Submission of China, China-Elements Contained in Paragraph 25 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration WT/WGTCP/W/227 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://
docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=l&_=l; Submission of Thailand,
Thailand-Core Principles, WT/WGTCP/W/213 (Sept. 26, 2002).
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injustice to both developed and developing members, as well as dis-
courage developing countries to strive for improvement if no bench-
mark is set. This is very different from the recognition that
implementation may be different due to the differing legal traditions of
members. 
02
Hard-core Cartels
Other than Thailand's argument on export cartels and discus-
sion on political affiliations between developed countries, an interest-
ing comment about the EC submission on hard-core cartels is that it
was not prepared to take a stand on whether export cartels should be
included in the definition of hard-core cartels. 10 3 This is a position
taken by the OECD in general.
10 4
Modalities for Voluntary Cooperation
According to the WTO secretariat, four tools were identified for
voluntary cooperation based on bilateral competition agreements. As
discussed earlier, developing countries were marginalized in relation
to such agreements, as reflected by opinions among member nations.
While it is generally accepted that a competition policy committee
should be established, developed members see it only being necessary
for facilitating exchange of ideas and experience, 10 5 while developing
countries require a more formal function for the committee.' 0 6 Due to
lack of cooperation in the past, developing countries are concerned that
they will be targeted by industries of developed countries. 10 7 A related
issue is the criticism that the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
102 See Submission of Canada, Canada-Possible Elements of a Multilateral
Framework for Competition, WT/WGTCP/W/226 (Mar. 12, 2003), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=l&-=l.
103 Clarke & Evenett, supra note 63, at 36; Framework Agreement on Competi-
tion, European Communities-International Hard Core Cartels and Cooperation
under a WTO, WT/WGTCP/W/193 (July 1, 2002), available at http:ldocson-
line.wto.org/gen-home.asp?language=l&_= 1.
104 See OECD Joint Forum on Trade and Competition, Issues for Trade and Com-
petition in the Global Context: A Synthesis, at 12.
105 Submission of Canada, Canada-Towards a Flexible Framework for Coopera-
tion, WT/WGTCP/W/202 (Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen-home.asp?language=1&_=1.
106 Submission of Thailand, Thailand-International Cooperation in Competition
Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/205 (Aug. 15, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
genhome.asp?language=1&_=1.
107 Clarke & Evenett, supra note 63, at 37. Such concerns are not unreasonable as
developing countries experienced similar targeting during the initial years after
the WTO anti-dumping regime was introduced.
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lacks the technical competence to handle competition cases.10 8 This
issue should be viewed from two angles: building the requisite compe-
tence within the WTO by employing qualified staff, and ensuring that
capacity building is undertaken in developing countries. 10 9 Another
acceptable standard of competence must be achieved before any bind-
ing obligations are undertaken. Other dispute settlement issues, such
as public access to dispute procedures and issues of efficiency vis-A-vis
non-discrimination, should be addressed after the competence issue is
settled.110
S&D
Developing countries have made a number of varying argu-
ments relating to S&D. One argument in particular stresses that S&D
should be a core principle in the WTO framework."' This reflects the
cautiousness of developing countries in entering into binding obliga-
tions and has been an issue on the agenda of developing countries in
almost every aspect of WTO business.
CONCLUSION
The main obstacle to attaining consensus for a global competi-
tion regime is the differing level of development between developed
and developing countries. An analysis of the contradictory views ex-
pressed by competition writers and those of WTO members indicates
that these contradictions stem from the differing needs of these coun-
tries based on the different dimensions of development and subse-
quent objectives of overall governmental policies. This view has been
recognized by the WTO secretariat when commenting that the need for
exemptions expressed by both sides is due to the diversity between
members." 2 Technical cooperation has gone a long way in narrowing
these differences, leading to the recognition that such a framework
should preserve a "policy space" for developing countries to pursue eco-
nomic and social policies for development." 3 Additionally, there has
been a shift in perspective of developing countries that initially op-
posed any regulation of international competition. The main concerns
of developing countries are the loss of a very important policy tool
108 NAMBIAR, supra note 3, at 22.
109 This would mean expanding the secretariat, therefore increasing contributions
from developed countries that see the benefits of global welfare.
110 Giardina & Zampetti, supra note 24.
111 Submission of Thailand, Thailand-Core Principles, WT/WGTCP/W/213 (Sept.
26, 2002).
112 Annual Report of the Working Group 2002, WT/WGTCP/6 (Dec. 9, 2002), avail-
able at http://docsonline.wto.org/genjhome.asp?language=l&_=l.
113 Id.
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through national treatment obligations and an under-appreciation of
their needs resulting from marginalization from standard setting ini-
tiatives to date.
Some critics have suggested using foreign investment laws to
circumvent national treatment obligations regarding merger reviews
for different treatment of domestic and foreign company mergers to
attain industrial policy objectives.1 14 This view fails to take into ac-
count other issues recently discussed at the WTO, including the possi-
ble multilateral framework on investment that may increase caution
among developing nations. One may question whether developed
countries are even ready for a regime of global magnitude, due to the
level of transparency that is required for an international initiative.
Such an initiative requires compromise among all members, even the
most powerful.
1 15
Current discussion of competition within the WTO is the most
advanced its ever been. Its existing mechanisms and membership
makes it the most viable institution for pursuing a global framework.
However, due to the working process in the WTO,1 1 6 and the uncer-
tainty of whether influential nations will compromise, explicit consen-
sus will not likely be reached in the near future.
114 Clarke & Evenett, supra note 63, at 41.
115 Maher M. Debbah, Measuring the Success of a System of Competition Law: A
Preliminary View, 21 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 369 (2000).
116 The working process for drafting a framework entails a study of all existing
member laws.
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